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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to examine the extent to which Chinese and Indian auto-
component producers have advanced towards international best practice levels of 
productivity and quality. The report is based on a survey of nine car manufacturers in 
China and six in India; a range of general component suppliers in both countries, and on 
a detailed benchmarking study of six seat producers and six exhaust suppliers in each 
country. 
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One of the key drivers of industrial development lies in the integration of local firms into 
global supply chains. The most highly developed supply chain is that of the car industry, 
and over the past decade, Chinese and Indian companies have begun to play a major 
role in its extension. Central to this development has been the arrival in both countries 
of a wave of international car makers, often operating as joint ventures with local 
partners. As this new generation of car makers develop the domestic supply chain in 
sourcing their own needs, they interact with local suppliers (some of whom are 
themselves multinational joint ventures). The transfer of production know-how that 
results drives advances in productivity, but more importantly it drives advances in 
product quality, without which exporting prospects remain poor, however low their 
prices. 
 
To what extent are these processes now occurring in China and India? How big a part 
are multinational joint ventures playing in each country’s exports of components? How 
close have domestic component suppliers moved to international best practice levels of 
productivity and quality? How deeply has this process penetrated the local supply 
chain?   
 
These are the issues explored in what follows. 
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1. Background 
The 1990s saw a remarkable transformation of the car industry in both India and China. At 
the beginning of the decade, there had been only a very limited involvement of multinational 
firms, and total production volumes in both countries remained modest. In 1991, India 
produced about 209,000 cars, while China produced about 81,000. Foreign involvement in 
China, up to that date, had been very limited: an early joint venture by Chrysler to produce 
jeeps (“Beijing Jeep”) had been marked by continuing difficulties. in India, however, a link 
up with Suzuki, forming the Suzuki-Maruti company (now Maruti Udyog) led to early 
success. The once dominant Hindustan Motors, whose ‘Ambassador’ model (essentially the 
1960s vintage Morris Oxford) had been India’s biggest selling car for decades, lost market 
share at a dramatic rate to the new Suzuki-Maruti model, which went on to capture 70% of 
passenger car sales by the early 1990s. 
 
The Suzuki-Maruti plant, located outside Delhi, developed a network of suppliers during the 
early 1990s. Some of these were joint ventures, in which Suzuki-Maruti held a substantial 
stake, while others were independent domestic firms. In both cases, Suzuki-Maruti worked 
with suppliers to establish international best practice, and to achieve high levels of 
productivity and quality. 
 
From the early ’90s onwards, a wave of multinational firms entered both markets. In both 
countries, these entrants were required to achieve a high level of domestic content within a 
specified period (typically, 70% within 3 years). For at least some of the new entrants, this 
was seen as an unreasonable target, as domestic suppliers could not meet the price and 
quality requirements of the car makers. Achieving the 70% target required the car makers to 
switch rapidly from a reliance on imported components to sourcing from local vendors; and 
this in turn gave the car makers a strong incentive to work closely with (first-tier) suppliers, 
to ensure that quality standards were met, within an acceptable price.  
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By the end of the decade, car production had increased by a factor of two and a half in India 
(from 209 thousand units in 1991 to 564 thousand in 2001), and by a factor of almost nine in 
China (from 81 thousand in 1991 to over 703 thousand in 2001). (Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1)1 
Over the same period, the supply chain had undergone a major transformation. The new 
generation of multinationals worked closely with local suppliers to achieve high standards of 
productivity and quality. Meanwhile, domestic car makers in both countries faced intense 
competition for market share, and their response was to upgrade productivity and quality 
levels in their own plants, and to look for higher quality levels from their (first-tier) 
suppliers. 
 
Table 1.1: Total production of passenger cars, 1993-2001 in India and China 
 
                                     India                                       China 
Financial Year Production Financial Year Production 
1991-92 (209,200)* 91 81,055 
1992-93 (192,200)* 92 162,725 
1993-94 207,658 93 229,697 
1994-95 264,468 94 250,333 
1995-96 348,146 95 325,461 
1996-97 407,539 96 391,099 
1997-98 401,002 97 487,695 
1998-99 390,555 98 507,861 
1999-00 574,369 99 566,105 
2000-01 517,907 00 607,455 
2001-02 564,113 01 703,525 
 
Source: ACMA, Facts and Figures: Automotive Industry India, 2001-2002, Automotive Component     
Manufacturers Association of India. 
Automotive Industry of China 2002, China Association of Automobile Manufacturers/China  
Automotive Technology and Research Center.  
 
* Including SUVs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 These volumes correspond to about one-tenth of Japan’s production in the same year.  In 2003, the world’s leading producers 
were Japan (8.1 million units), Germany (5.3), the United States (4.9), France (3.2), Korea (2.4) and Spain (2.2).  China ranked 
fourteenth and India fifteenth. 
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Figure 1.1: Car Production in India and China 1993-2001 
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Note: Indian figures for fiscal year ’93-’94 are shown here as ’93, etc. 
 
 
By the end of the decade, eight firms accounted for almost all production of passenger cars 
in India (Table 1.2). Six of the eight were multinational joint ventures, and these accounted 
for 85% of units sold. In China, eight car makers accounted for 94% of output, and six of 
these, accounting for 84% of output, were international joint ventures (Table 1.3). 
 
00     01
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Table 1.2:  Leading Car Makers in India, 2001-2 
 
  No. of units 
produced 
  Market 
  Share 
1 Maruti Udyog Ltd (Suzuki j.v.) 351,949 62.2%
2 Hyundai Motor India Ltd. 93,888 16.5%
3 Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. 64,712 11.5%
4 Hindustan Motors Ltd. 19,398 3.4%
5 Ford India Ltd. 14,306 2.5%
6 Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 10,310 1.8%
7 General Motors India Ltd. 8,135 1.4%
8 Daimler Chrysler India Pvt. Ltd. 1,415 0.2%
 Total Production (All firms*) 564,113 
 Share of top eight 100% 
 
*A small number produced by Fiat and by Daewoo is ‘not available’.   
Source:  As for Table 1.1 
 
 
Table 1.3:  Leading Car-Makers in China, 2001 
 
  No. of units 
produced 
Market 
Share 
1 Shanghai  VW Automotive Co. Ltd. 230,281 32.7%
2 FAW-VW Automotive Co. Ltd. 133,893 18.9%
3 Dongfeng Motor Corporation (Citroen j.v.) 72,192 10.2%
4 Shanghai General Motors Corporation Ltd.  58,543 8.2%
5 Guangzhou Honda Automobile Co. Ltd. 51,146 7.2%
6 Tianjin Automotive Xiali Co. Ltd. (Daihatsu 
j.v.) 
51,019 7.2%
7 Changan Automobile (Group) Liability Co. Ltd. 43,123 6.1%
8 China FAW Group Corporation 21,488 3.0%
 Total Production (All Firms) 661,685 
 Share of top 8: 94% 
 
Source:  As for Table 1.1 
 
2.  Benchmarking the Supply Chain.  Part I:  An Overview 
The component supply chain developed rapidly in both countries over the decade, with the 
value of component production almost doubling from 1997 to 2001 in both countries. By 
2001, China’s component output, and exports, exceeded India’s by a factor of about 3 (Table 
2.1). India’s top 10 component exporters, however, had total export sales of about two-thirds 
the level of their Chinese counterparts (Tables 2.2 and 2.3).  Of these top 10 Indian 
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exporters, six were multinational joint ventures while three form part of a single domestic 
group (the T.V.S. group), (Table 2.2). Of China’s top ten component exporters, four have 
one or more multinational joint venture partners, while six are domestic firms. 
 
Table 2.1:  Auto-Component Production and Exports 1997-2001 
 
 India China 
 
Year 
Value of Output 
(million US $) 
Value of Exports 
(Million US $) 
Value of Output 
(million US $) 
Value of Exports 
(Million US $) 
1997 2,406 299 7,343 735 
1998 2,599 314 8,441 660 
1999 3,271 366 9,731 951 
2000 3,571 541 10,060 1,065 
2001 4,203 555 13,325 1,751 
 
Note: Figures for India relate to financial years, e.g. the 1997 figure relates to the financial year ’97-’98,  
and so on. 
 
Source:  As for Table 1.1 
 
 
 
6 
Table 2.2:  Leading Component Exporters, India 2001-2 
 
 
Multinational or 
Multinational 
j.v.  (M) 
Domestic   (D) 
     Company Exports 
million  
US $ 
Items Exported 
M Visteon Automotive Systems  
India Pvt. Ltd. 
55.4 Starter motors, alternators, climate  
control systems, instrument clusters 
M MICO (Motor Industries Co. Ltd.) 
(Bosch Group) 
40.5 Spark plugs, diesel fuel injection 
system 
D Bharat Forge Ltd. 23.1 Forging – crank shafts 
D *Brakes India Ltd. 17.8 Brake systems and components 
D *Sundaram Fasteners Ltd. 17.2 Specialised fasteners and radiator 
caps 
M Delphi Automotive Systems Pvt. 
Ltd. 
16.6 Shock absorbers, suspension 
systems 
M Phoenix Lamps (India) Ltd. 15.7 Halogen lamps 
M Sigma Corporation (India) Ltd. 11.1 Engine and transmission mounts  
M Motherson Sumi Systems Ltd. 9.2 Wiring harness 
D *Sundaram Brake Linings Ltd. 9.0 Brake lining and clutch facings 
 
Top 10 total  215.6 million $  Source: supplied by ACMA 
Overall total  555.0 million $  *member of the TVS group. 
Share of top 10 = 38.8 % 
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Table 2.3:  Leading Component Exporters, China, 2001 
 
Multinational or 
Multinational j.v. 
(M) 
Domestic  (D)          
 
Company 
Exports 
million  
US $ 
 
Items Exported 
D China FAW Group Corporation 44.3 Various 
M Kunshan Liufeng Machinery 
Industry Co. Ltd. 
61.2 Aluminium alloy wheel hubs 
M Siemens VDO Automotive Huizhou 
Co. Ltd. 
44.6 Car radios 
 * Wanxiang Qianchao Co. Ltd. 43.0 Universal joint, bearings, drive shaft,  
constant velocity joint, rubber seal 
elements, ball bearings 
M Shanghai Yanfeng Johnson 
Controls Seats Co. Ltd. 
43.0 Covers and parts for seats 
D Guangzhou City Huanan Rubber 
Tyre Co. Ltd. 
41.4 Covers for radial tyres 
D Zhejiang Wanfeng Autocar Group 29.8 Aluminium wheels  
D Shandong Longji Group Co. Ltd. 19.6 Brake drums; brake discs 
D Xiang Torch Investment Co Ltd 19.0 Brake discs, lights, mirrors, sparks 
plugs 
D Fujian Yuanguang Combined Wire 
Co. Ltd. 
18.7 Wiring harness 
 
Top 10 Total     364.6 mill $  Source: As for Table 1.1 
Overall Total      2,617.7 mill $ 
Share of top 10 = 14 %   *Domestic firm with many foreign j.v. partners. 
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The focus of the present study lies in examining the supply chain (or 
component supply industry) in each country from a number of perspectives: 
 
a) The depth and stability of the chain 
Here we aim to examine the degree to which efforts made in both 
countries to develop local suppliers in tandem with the arrival and 
expansion of the new wave of multinational car makers have succeeded. 
The aim underlying the domestic content rules imposed on the new 
arrivals was to bring about the development of a population of high 
quality domestically-based suppliers; to what extent has this succeeded, 
and will these suppliers retain their role in the wake of WTO entry 
(under which such restrictions are banned)? 
 
b) The quality of the chain 
The question here is, to what degree has international best practice been 
transferred to the domestically-based suppliers (whether these are 
independent domestic firms or joint ventures with multinational 
component producers)? We address this issue, which forms our main 
focus, from two angles, looking first at a comparison of supplier quality 
experienced by twinned pairs of buyers in India and China, and then 
turning, in the next section, to a detailed examination of two particular 
components (seats and exhausts) that lend themselves to cross-plant and 
cross-country benchmarking in respect of both productivity and quality. 
 
2.1  The Depth of the Chain 
The degree of development of the supply chain may be gauged by examining 
the extent to which car makers choose to buy in components, rather than 
manufacture in-house. To investigate this, we visited nine Chinese and six 
Indian car makers, and recorded the in-house versus buy-in decision for all 
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major components, assemblies and sub-assemblies. It is worth noting that the 
decision to manufacture in-house, or to buy in, is a subtle one.2 When the car 
industry first developed in the early years of the 20th century, almost all 
components were bought in. By the middle of the twentieth century, in-house 
production was the norm for major components. Over the past few decades, 
the pattern has moved heavily towards buying-in. The issue of interest here is 
the degree to which car makers have access to adequate local sources of 
supply. If the supply chain is well developed, then we expect to see a pattern 
in which only a couple of key components (the cylinder head and block) are 
almost always made in-house; a central group of key components, assemblies 
or sub-assemblies (shown as Group 2 in Table 2.4) may be outsourced or 
made in-house; while a final group of less central components are normally 
outsourced (Group 3 of Table 2.4). The table omits a large number of items 
that are virtually always outsourced. 
 
                                                 
2 For analysis of the strategic issues involved, placed in the context of the industry’s history, see Helper, S. 
‘Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry’, Business 
History Review, vol. 65, Winter 1991, pp. 781-824. 
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Table 2.4  Categories of Component 
Group 1 
(Normally made in-house) 
Group 3 
(Normally outsourced) 
Cylinder Head Pistons 
Cylinder Block Timing belt 
Group II 
(Often outsourced) 
Exhaust system 
Clutch 
Engine mounting Bumpers 
Crankshaft Seats 
Camshaft and valve Door panels 
Transmission Door fittings 
Transmission case Instrument panel 
Gear box Wiring harness 
Front axle Suspension, front and rear 
Rear axle: Centre bracket Braking system 
Rear axle: Shaft  
Body (skin) panels  
 
The pattern for India and China is as follows: 
• The Cylinder head and block are made in house by eight of the nine 
Chinese firms, but three of the six Indian firms outsource them. 
 
• For the second group (see Table 2.4), there is an even balance between 
in-house production and outsourcing in both countries. The fraction of 
in-house production in China is 49% (i.e. of the 10 components across 9 
producers, there are 44 instances where the component is bought-in 
against 46 where it is made in-house). The corresponding figure for 
India is 55%. This suggests a very similar pattern of outsourcing in both 
countries. A detailed examination of the pattern shows no anomalies: 
for each of these components, and for both countries, between one-third 
and two-thirds of the firms are outsourcing the component.  In a large 
proportion of cases, the supplier is a joint venture with a multinational 
component supplier, or an affiliate of the (foreign) car makers. For 
China, 45% of the outsourcing instances in Group 2 for which the 
relevant information was available came from a joint venture or affiliate 
of the car maker; the corresponding figure for India is 55%. 
 
• For components in the third group, outsourcing is almost universal in 
both countries. For these 13 components, the nine Chinese firms have a 
90% incidence of outsourcing, while the Indian firms have an incidence 
of 83%. 
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What these figures suggest is that car makers in both countries show a similar 
pattern of outsourcing, and this pattern is consistent with what we would 
expect to observe in an environment where there were no serious limits to the 
availability of suitable local suppliers. 
 
2.2 Supplier Quality 
Assessing the quality levels achieved by firms in different parts of the supply 
chain (as conventionally measured by the fraction of parts found to be 
defective) by the buyer poses a number of difficulties: 
 
i) Some types of component pose greater problems than others in 
manufacturing, and so defect rates for best practice producers will vary 
widely from one component to another. 
 
ii) Systematic differences in levels of quality may be expected as we move 
down the supply chain, from first-tier to second-tier suppliers, and so 
on.3 
 
In light of these difficulties, we attack the problem in two ways. In this 
section, we look at three twinned pairs of buyers, one in India and one in 
China, chosen for their close similarity in terms of the range of components 
they buy. We examine the distribution of quality across each buyer’s 
suppliers. This method allows us to obtain a snapshot of the quality of the 
supply chain at three different points. The strength of this method lies in the 
breadth of coverage: we are looking here at a wide range of components 
supplied. In the next section, we adopt a complementary approach by looking 
at the picture from the supplier’s side. We take two specific components (seats 
and exhausts) and look at half a dozen suppliers of each component in each 
                                                 
3 The supply chain is usually described by reference to a number of tiers.  ‘Tier 1 suppliers’ are those selling 
directly to the car maker (assembler).  ‘Tier 2 suppliers’ are those selling directly to the ‘Tier 1’ firms, and so 
on. 
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country. This allows us to examine the range of performance across different 
suppliers of the same product. 
 
In this section, then, we adopt the first approach, viz. examining twinned pairs 
of buyer firms.  The first pair of twinned firms are car makers.  Each is a 
recently established multinational firm. Having been established less than a 
decade, each of these firms benefited from the early development of the local 
supply chain that took place up to the early 1990s in each country. Each firm 
has taken advantage of the option of inviting some of its home country 
suppliers to set up joint ventures with local firms in order to ensure supplier 
quality. 
 
The histograms in Figure 2.1 show the range of quality, as measured by 
defects found in incoming components – expressed in ‘parts per million’ 
defective.  International best practice for car makers in the U.S., Japan and 
Europe currently aims to bring the large majority of suppliers under 100 ppm.  
The histograms for the Indian and Chinese companies are fairly similar.  In 
each case, about half of the suppliers achieve a figure under 100 ppm.  The 
tail of the distribution is also similar: the fraction of suppliers with defect rates 
exceeding 1500 ppm is about one-eighth (Table 2.5). 
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Figure 2.1 Supplier Defect Rates for a Twinned Pair of New Generation Car Makers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These distributions confirm the view suggested by discussions in the course of 
plant visits that, in both India and China, first-tier suppliers to newly arrived 
car makers are already operating close to world class standards in terms of 
incoming component defect rates. 
 
The next two pairs of histograms relate to suppliers further down the chain. 
Here, we aim to distinguish suppliers of very basic components (such as 
pressed and metal parts) and more sophisticated components (requiring, for 
example, a series of machining and assembly operations). The first pair of 
companies are seat producers who buy in parts or sections of metal frames 
(pressed and stamped components, in some cases welded into a sub-
assembly). Each buyer is a seat supplier to one of the country’s leading car 
makers. 
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Table 2.5  Supplier Deficit Rates for Two Twinned Pairs of Buyers 
Percentage of Suppliers 
Defect Rate Car maker, 
China 
Car maker, 
India 
Seat Producer, 
China 
Seat 
Producer, 
India 
<100 ppm 55 43 60 72 
100-300 17 17 20 4 
-700 10 7 8 0 
-1500 6 20 4 3 
-3000 5 7 4 5 
-7000 7 4 0 4 
-12000 0 0 4 1 
-25000 0 2 0 1 
>25000 0 0 0 9 
 
Note:  figures may not add to 100 due to rounding 
The histogram of ppm rates for incoming components from the firms’ various 
suppliers are shown in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.5. In each case, about two-
thirds of suppliers achieve a defect rate below 100 ppm. The tail of 
distribution is longer in the Indian case, with about one-fifth of suppliers 
above 1500 ppm, as opposed to one-tenth for the Chinese firm. Overall, 
however, performance in both countries is close to the levels expected of 
world class suppliers in the U.S., Europe and Japan. 
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Figure 2.2  Supplier Defect Rates for Seat Producers 
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Figure 2.3  Supplier Defect Rates for Steering Gear Producers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 Supplier Defect Rates for a Twinned Pair of Steering Gear Producers 
 
                                               Percentage of Suppliers 
Defect Rate % China India 
<1% 60 80 
1-10% 29 7 
10-20% 8 9 
20-40% 4 2 
>40% 0 2 
 
 
What is striking about the distributions shown in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.6, 
however, is how wide this disparity is both for the Chinese and the Indian 
suppliers. In each case, the steering-gear manufacturer experiences extremely 
high rates of incoming defects. These rates are measured, not in parts per 
million found defective, but rather in terms of the percentage of incoming 
batches found to be (un-) acceptable on first inspection. (Random samples are 
drawn from each batch on arrival.  If the sampled parts are defective, the batch 
is returned to the supplier, who will carry out a full inspection, and reject or 
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rework as necessary before sending a replacement batch). The threshold of 
interest is the percentage of batches deemed unacceptable at first inspection. 
Some 60% of Chinese suppliers and 80% of Indian suppliers achieve a figure 
of 1%. The tail of the distribution in each case is extremely long. About 4% of 
each firm’s suppliers have over 20% of their batches rejected on first 
inspection.   
 
It is here that the main weakness of the supply chain, relative to those of the 
U.S., Japan and Europe is evident. Manufacturing best practice has spread 
remarkably quickly to first-tier suppliers in both India and China over the past 
decade, as Figure 2.1 suggests. These practices have not as yet permeated 
through the lower tiers of the supply chain. Discussions with firms in the 
course of this study suggest an explanation. The spread of best practice among 
first-tier suppliers was driven by pressure from the car makers during the late 
1990s. These first-tier suppliers found themselves under pressures from the 
car makers, not only on quality, but also on price. Car makers worked actively 
with some first tier suppliers to achieve low defect rates, while other first tier 
suppliers were joint ventures with multinational component suppliers who 
introduced best practice techniques.  But when these suppliers turned to their 
own (‘Tier 2’) suppliers they faced a trade-off. Should they stay with a low-
cost supplier, and accept high defect rates, or move to a higher cost supplier? 
High defect rates can be dealt with by spending more man-hours on the 
inspection of incoming parts, which are sent back to the supplier if found 
defective. In a low-wage environment, the cost of inspection, and of 
reworking, may be more acceptable to the buyer and seller. Only when the 
first-tier supplier begins to work closely with suppliers, and to de-select 
suppliers who have high defect rates, is best practice likely to spread. While 
our interviews with component suppliers suggest that this process is 
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occurring, it is also clear that it is happening only very slowly in both 
countries, and the threshold for de-selection can be very high. (Boxes 1 and 
2). 
 
The stability of the chain 
Given the current state of development of the supply chain, a key question is: 
will the car-makers now begin to take advantage of WTO entry to import 
components and sub-assemblies, following the pattern that some of the new 
arrivals regarded as optimal in the 1990s? Here, the discussions with car-
makers in the course of the study suggest the answer is a clear and consistent 
‘no’. The view expressed in all cases was that the car-maker had developed 
local sources of supply that were superior, in terms of the combination of cost 
and quality, to imported alternatives. This suggests that the development of 
the local supply chain under local content restrictions in the years prior to 
WTO entry has, in these industries, been highly successful.
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Box 1 
 
A Timescale for Capability Building 
 
One question of central importance relates to the timescale for capability building: how 
long does it take to reach world-class levels of quality?  Conventional wisdom among 
multinational component producers involved in the present study is that starting with a new 
workforce on a greenfield site is a major advantage: one executive based at the world 
headquarters of a multinational seat maker remarked that he would expect to be able to 
achieve world-class quality standards at a greenfield plant in any country within one year 
of its establishment. If, however, he was operating in a joint venture with an established 
local seat maker, this process might take three years. The difference reflects the slowness 
of “relearning”: if established routines are in place, it is hard to change them; beginning 
from scratch is easier*. While the figures suggested may be optimistic, this key difference 
is bourne out by the (limited) set of observations we have been able to make of the time 
profiles of external defect rates in selected participating firms. 
 
For example: 
 
• A multinational seat-maker operating on a greenfield site in India experienced an 
initial level of its external defect rate of 2,085 ppm (as compared to a “world-class 
threshold” of 100 ppm). In its third year of operation, this rate had fallen to 65 ppm, 
close to the 50 ppm level regarded as “award class” by multinational seat makers. 
• One of the leading domestic seat makers on the Indian market began in the mid-90s 
to introduce international best practice procedures.  Beginning from an initial 
external defect rate of 20,000, it took five years of steadily-improving performance 
to bring this figure down to its present level of 200 ppm. 
 
Among multinational seat and exhaust makers, engineers from high performing plants are 
regularly transferred to newly formed joint ventures with established domestic producers. 
One engineer, who had been seconded from a world-class greenfield plant in India to a 
recently-established joint venture plant in China, remarked that his six-month stint would 
be “largely a matter of talking”.  It was not, he remarked, the obvious alterations to the 
physical plant that mattered, but rather inducing a shift in work practices. At the most 
elementary level, this would involve a move away from traditional notions of “inspection at 
the end of the production line”, to a system in which each operator along the line searched 
for defects in each seat section as it arrived, and as it departed: the idea of such constant 
monitoring is in part to avoid “adding value to defective units”; more importantly, it is to 
set the basis for a system in which the sources of defects are quickly identified and 
rectified. (See Box 2). 
________________________ 
*The difference also reflects, in some of the plants visited, the existence of prior contractual 
agreements on incentive schemes and payment systems, and on working practices, that are hard to 
change. 
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Box 2 
 
Starting from Scratch 
 
The key to achieving high levels of productivity and quality lies in the establishment of a 
series of inter-related working practices that have become standard in the global auto-
industry over the past generation.  A recurring theme in company interviews is that this is 
much easier to achieve in a new firm operating on a greenfield site, with newly hired 
employees; and rather than looking for prior experience in the industry, the newly 
established employer may deliberately hire individuals who have never worked in the 
industry before. 
 
So how can an established domestic firm adapt?  A striking illustration is provided by a 
long-established Indian manufacturer of mechanical components (steering-gear and related 
parts). In order to win and service a major new export contract from a multinational car-
maker, the firm recently established a new small-scale plant alongside its main premises.  
Employing a small workforce of male and female operatives, all in their early twenties, and 
with no prior employment experience, the plant is organized along ‘Japanese’ lines: each 
operative is responsible for all aspects of his or her work area, including sweeping and 
cleaning. All shop floor workers, whether skilled or unskilled, spend a month working as 
cooks in the canteen, in order to instil a sense that everyone is working as an equal member 
of a team, whose shared aim is to achieve the highest possible levels of quality. 
 
This is an extreme example, but it is illustrative of a broad tendency that was evident in 
about one-half of the Indian seat and exhaust producers visited in the course of the study: 
the achievement of high quality standards goes hand in hand with an erosion of traditional 
patterns of hierarchy within the plant. The emphasis, instead, is on building teams of 
equals, who work in close cooperation (via ‘quality circles’ etc.) to bring about a steady 
flow of minor innovations in working methods, whose cumulative effect is substantial. 
 
As one manager at a domestic Indian firm remarked in the course of our interview: “We 
take our technology from Europe, but our production practices come from Japan”. 
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3.  Benchmarking the Supply Chain.  Part II: Seat and Exhaust Makers 
3.1 Motivation 
The main difficulty in comparing productivity and quality across firms lies in 
the fact that each firm has a different product mix, and controlling for 
differences in the firms’ products is difficult. Two producers of gearboxes, for 
example, would be difficult to compare in a satisfactory way since the 
differences in design, and manufacturing complexity across different 
gearboxes are very great, and since the machine shop producing gearboxes is 
likely to produce a wide range of (other) components, making the allocation 
of labour hours to each product line problematic. 
 
For this reason, we focus here on two products that permit a relatively fair and 
transparent comparison across rival producers: seats and exhausts. In both 
cases, the component is normally produced in a single specialist plant, which 
produces at most a handful of major product lines. The design and complexity 
of the products produced by different firms are fairly similar, and it is possible 
to identify and make allowances for such differences as exist. 
 
A multi-country study of seat and exhaust production in North America, Japan 
and Europe was carried out by a team of consultants organized by Andersen 
Consulting in the late 1990s.4 That study provides some useful reference 
points in respect of international best practice in what follows. 
 
3.2  The Sample 
The aim of the exercise is to compare productivity and quality levels across 
the industry’s leading firms. With this in mind, we identified the seat and 
                                                 
4 Oliver, N., D.T Jones, R. Delbridge, J. Lowe, P. Roberts and B. Thayer (1993) “Worldwide Manufacturing 
Competitiveness Study: The Second Lean Enterprise Report,” Andersen Consulting, London. 
This study covered France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Spain, the U.K., the U.S. and Canada.  As well as 
seats and exhausts, it also covered braking systems; (where cross-firm comparisons are more problematic). 
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exhaust producers who supply the leading car makers in each country. We 
then chose a representative set of 6 of these of seat suppliers and 6 of these 
exhausts suppliers in each country, i.e. a total of 24 suppliers. These suppliers 
include some which are joint ventures with, or affiliates of, major 
multinational seat or exhaust producers who supply international car makers 
across the world. Others of our sample firms are domestic producers, some of 
whom are independent companies, and some of whom are affiliates of the car 
maker they supply. Data was collected via a series of interviews and plant 
visits to each supplier. 
 
In all cases, these firms supply a similar product, or set of products.  In the 
case of seat suppliers, the standard product is a seat set for a passenger car (2 
front and 1 rear (bench) seat). In the case of exhaust suppliers, the standard 
product on which we base our analysis is an exhaust, comprising muffler, 
manifold and tubes. We are concerned with measuring productivity in the 
manufacture of such an exhaust, beginning from steel tube and sheet steel. 
This process involves a series of cutting, bending and welding operations. 
 
We are concerned here with looking at productivity in the assembly process, 
and with two measures of quality. We measure productivity in terms of the 
number of seat sets, or exhausts, produced per man-hour in the assembly 
process. Quality is measured at two points. The first relates to the fraction of 
units found to be defective during the production process i.e. units pulled from 
the line, or units failing to pass final inspection (the ‘internal defect rate’). The 
second is the ‘external’ defect rate (used in the previous section, i.e. a measure 
of the quality of units delivered to the car-maker).   
 
Beyond these productivity and quality measures, we also look at two 
supplementary measures of manufacturing performance: these relate to the 
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coordination of production with materials’ suppliers and with the customer 
(i.e. the car maker). The first is a measure of the level of inventory held, either 
as raw material or work in progress. This is measured as the ratio of the value 
of total materials purchased per annum to the value of the stock of raw 
materials and work in progress on a typical day. Thus, if a firm holds one 
week’s worth of materials and work in progress, and operates for 52 weeks a 
year, then its ‘stock turn ratio’ is 52. The second supplementary measure is the 
frequency of delivery to the car maker, expressed as a multiple of ‘daily 
deliveries’: if, for example, the firm delivers twice a day, then its frequency is 
2. These two supplementary measures provide an additional indicator of the 
extent to which the organization of production conforms to international best 
practice. 
 
3.3  Choice of Technique 
In comparing levels of labour productivity the most obvious and immediate 
consideration to address lies in differences in the technique of production, as 
measured by the degree of capital intensity (or capital-labour ratio) chosen in 
different firms, or countries. Given that cross-country wage differences are 
typically far greater then differences in the cost of capital, we might expect 
that firms in low-wage countries would find it optimal to work at a lower 
degree of capital intensity, and so a lower level of labour productivity (as 
defined by the number of units of output per man-hour).5 
 
Matters are complicated, however, once the quality of units produced becomes 
pertinent.  It may be, for example, that a low level of capital intensity makes it 
more difficult to reach acceptable quality standards. While this point is 
obvious, the trade-offs involved in this area can be quite subtle. 
                                                 
5 To make the same point in a different way, a lower level of labour productivity is consistent with a high 
level of ‘total factor productivity’. 
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A comparison of experience between seat producers and the exhaust makers is 
particularly revealing in respect of such trade-offs, since the two product lines 
differ in ways that are highly relevant to firms’ choices in this area. In each 
case, it is feasible to manufacture the product using different degrees of 
capital intensity. For seats, the cutting of material can be done by hand, or 
using an automated (computer controlled) cutting table. The sewing is done on 
industrial sewing machines, on individual benches; the machines can be low-
cost machines of a traditional kind, or more sophisticated machines in which 
the material is ‘moved through’ automatically as sewing proceeds, rather than 
being inched through manually. Firms included in the present study used both 
types of techniques in these two areas. In the assembly operation, however, to 
which our productivity measures relates, there is little variation in the degree 
of capital intensity of the process across firms, or across countries.  Seats are 
in industry parlance, an ‘A-surface’, i.e. one that is immediately visible to the 
final customer. This means that the relevant measure of quality for seats 
extends to minute surface characteristics (the spacing of threads on the sewn 
joints, the presence of loose thread-ends, the uniform tautness of the fabric 
over each section of the seats, etc.). This consideration constrains the 
organization of the production process, and the use of alternative methods that 
might involve wide differences in capital intensity. Seats are assembled either 
in a production line, or in a series of ‘cells’, and their assembly essentially 
involves a sequence of operations in which sections of the metal frame, the 
foam interior, and the sewn cover, are fitted together. The use of jigs on which 
sections are mounted for fitting is standard. The only automated process is one 
in which a foam section is ‘shrunk’ to allow a sewn cover to be fitted over it; 
this is done for headrests in most plants, but not for other seat sections. (It 
would not be appropriate in the case of most seat types in the present study). 
 
25 
The case of exhausts is very different. Here, the degree of capital intensity 
varies very widely across firms within the same country. This reflects, in part, 
the fact that the exhaust is a B-surface, i.e. one that is not immediately visible 
to the final customer. What matters, in terms of quality, is the mechanical 
strength of each welded joint, as opposed to the visible smoothness or 
uniformity of the weld. This permits the use of a wide range  of techniques in 
the welding operations.6   
 
Welding techniques are of three kinds (‘generations’). In increasing order of 
capital intensity, they involve: 
• A production line along which each worker carries out one or more 
welds using a simple hand-held welding torch. The sections to be 
welded are clamped into a jig, and held in a fixed position. 
 
• A line on which each station has an automated jig, on which the 
clamped sections of the exhaust move (rotate), while the welding torch 
is held in a fixed position on a stand or bracket. 
 
• A fully automated system in which the welds are done by robots. The 
only manual work involves placing and clamping the sections onto a 
jig. (In some cases, the jig then rotates through 1800, bringing the 
sections into an enclosed area, where robots carry out the welds. The 
part is then flipped back for unloading). 
 
The capital cost of a set-up of the third kind will exceed by a factor of 
hundreds that of the first set-up. It might seem, therefore, that the choice of 
technique might rest primarily on the level of wages (relative to the cost of 
capital equipment), and so it might seem that, within a single country, most 
firms might use the same technique. This is not the case: the firms in the 
present study operate with a mix of techniques, covering the full range 
                                                 
6 Cutting sheet steel, and pipe bending, on the other hand, are done on similar machines throughout the 
industry – the former on low-cost traditional machine tools, and the latter on specialist automated ‘pipe 
bending’ machines, whose use is standard across (almost) all firms, in all countries. 
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described above. The reasons for this are revealing, in respect of the trade-offs 
firms face between productivity and quality, as we note below (Box 3). 
 
Apart from the choice of more or less capital-intensive methods, there are a 
number of further factors that might seem likely to affect differences in labour 
productivity across firms and countries. These include (a) the volume of 
production (scale economies) and (b) the nature of the firm (joint venture with 
foreign partner or independent domestic firm), (c) the complexity of the 
component produced.  In what follows, we investigate the possible influence 
of these factors. We find no influence for any of these factors in seat 
production, while in exhaust production, only one of these factors matters: 
productivity increases strongly and systematically with the volume of 
production. (See Tables 3.1 and 3.2). As to the impact of capital intensity, it 
has no statistically significant effect on differences in productivity across 
different exhaust makers, a point to which we return in the next Section. 
  
Table 3.1: Labour Productivity in Seats 
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept 1.10 0.55 2.00 
Country Dummy (China = 1) -0.99 0.46 -2.14 
JV 0.63 0.55 1.15 
Annual Production 
 
0.26 2.84 0.09 
 
Note: The complexity and degree of capital intensity is closely similar for all firms.  The variable 
JV is 1 if the firm is a joint venture with a multinational seat maker, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3.2 Labour Productivity in Exhausts 
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept  0.41 0.35  1.19 
Country Dummy (China = 1) -0.17 0.44 -0.38 
WDUM -0.33 0.67 -0.50 
LDUMLO -0.12 0.44 -0.26 
LDUMHI 0.62 0.73 0.84 
JV -0.21 0.82 -0.26 
Annual Production   6.77 2.46  2.75 
 
Note:  The degree of capital intensity in the production process: if most welds are carried out using 
hand-held welding tools, LDUM LO is 1.  If no welds are carried out using hand-held welding 
tools, and over 20% of welds are carried out on robots, LDUM HI is 1.  Otherwise these variables 
are set to zero.  (See text).  The variable WDUM measures the complexity of the exhaust by 
reference to the number of major welds (i.e. excluding spot welds amnd tab welds).  If the number 
exceeds 8, WDUM is set to 1; otherwise it is set to zero.  The variable JV is 1 if the firm is a joint 
venture with a multinational exhaust producer, and 0 otherwise. 
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Figure 3.1  Productivity versus Annual Production Volume in Seats 
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Figure 3.2 Productivity versus Annual Production Volume for Exhausts 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000 350000 400000 450000 500000
Annual Prod. Vol.
La
bo
ur
 P
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 (u
ni
ts
 p
er
 m
an
-h
ou
r)
India Exhausts
China Exhausts
 
29 
In the light of these results we may conveniently illustrate the China-India 
comparison by way of the scatter diagrams shown as Figures 3.1 and 3.2, 
which depict labour productivity vs. production volume for seat and exhaust 
makers respectively. The main feature to emerge from these figures is that, in 
exhaust production, average production volumes and average productivity 
levels are similar in both countries, though the dispersion across firms on both 
variables is much narrower in China: India has some very small, low 
productivity producers as well as one high volume, high productivity 
producer. (Figure 3.1). In seats, average production volumes are similar in 
both countries. Productivity is significantly higher in India, with all of the top 
three firms being Indian. (Figure 3.2). 
 
A closer look at productivity differences across exhaust producers is provided 
in the next two figures, which depict the same relation for Indian exhaust 
makers only (Figure 3.3) and for Chinese exhaust makers only (Figure 3.4). 
These figures show the influence of product complexity and capital intensity. 
The product is described as ‘lower complexity’ if the number of welds is less 
than 10 (a relatively simple exhaust) and ‘higher complexity’ otherwise. The 
degree of capital intensity is measured by an index which takes the value of 1, 
it is described as ‘low’ if most welds are carried out using hand-held welding 
tools; it is described as ‘high’ if no welds are carried out in this way – where  
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Figure 3.3 Productivity versus Annual Production Volume in Exhausts: India 
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Figure 3.4  Productivity versus Annual Production Volume in Exhausts: China 
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more than 20% of welds are done by robots; and it is labelled ‘medium’ in all 
intermediate cases. Two points emerge from these scatters: 
 
i) Two of the Indian exhaust makers are manufacturing low volumes 
of relatively simple exhausts using highly labour intensive methods 
(the points to the bottom left of Figure 3.3). 
 
ii) Two of the Chinese producers (but none of the Indian producers) are 
using highly capital intensive techniques, in which most welds are 
done by robot. These plants, however, are not relatively high volume 
plants, nor do they exhibit unusually high levels of labour 
productivity (a point to which we return below). 
 
With all these controls and qualifications in place, we may now ask: how do 
these levels of labour productivity compare with leading plants in the U.S., 
Japan or Europe? For seats, where techniques of production are closely similar 
across countries, labour productivity levels are also closely similar. The 
Andersen survey of 1996 identified a productivity level of 1 seat set per man 
hour as the median value in their sample, which they identified as their 
benchmark for world class productivity levels. Discussions with multinational 
seat producers in the course of the present study indicate that this figure 
remains valid, and constitutes a norm for world-class producers in high-wage 
countries. As Figure 3.1 indicates, the median value for Indian and Chinese 
producers is approximately 1, suggesting that world class norms are being 
achieved. 
 
In relation to exhausts, a different picture emerges. Here, a wide range of  
levels of capital-intensity can be used, as we have seen. Given local wage 
rates, and setting quality consideration aside, it will be economically optimal 
for Chinese and Indian firms to employ a relatively labour intensive 
technique, leading to a lower level of labour productivity (which does not 
imply a lower level of total factor productivity). 
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The median level of labour productivity in both Chinese and Indian plants is 
about 1 unit per man-hour. This compares with a threshold figure of 6 units 
per man-hour for the plants surveyed in the Andersen study of 1996, which 
identified this median figure for the firms it surveyed as the threshold of 
world-class performance. Discussions with multinational exhaust producers 
suggest that this figure remains valid as a norm for world class plants in high-
wage countries. 
 
If all plants in India and China were using relatively labour-intensive 
techniques, this gap in labour productivity levels would be unsurprising. What 
is of interest, is that a wide range of levels of capital intensity are in use; and 
while a very low degree of capital intensity implies low productivity (finding 
(i) above), the use of robot-based production does not lead to very high levels 
of labour productivity. The benefits of shifting to a more capital intensive 
technique lie elsewhere (see Box 3). In the next section, we turn to the central 
focus of the study: the benchmarking of quality. 
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Box 3 
Why robots?  Choice of Technique in Exhaust Manufacture 
 
Of the six Chinese exhaust makers, three use robots for some of their welding operations.  
At first glance this might seem a surprising choice of technique: given low local wage 
rates, the use of the most capital-intensive of the three available production techniques 
might seem inappropriate. One payoff from this choice, however, lies in achieving high 
quality standards – not in terms of the “external defect rate” (the quality of parts delivered 
to the customer), but rather in terms of minimising the loss of materials in the course of 
production (scrap losses). The largest component of the firm’s unit costs in exhaust 
production are accounted for by materials costs (primarily tube and sheet steel), excluding 
the cost of catalytic converters. The use of robots minimises scrap losses, and the payoff 
from switching to robots is at its highest on complex welds, such as those on a tube 
manifold7, or those in which tubes are welded to the (very expensive) catalytic converter 
unit. Of the three Chinese makers employing robots, one (“Plant A”) uses them only for 
catalytic converter welds, a second (“Plant B”) uses them primarily for tube manifold 
welds, while a third (“Plant C”) uses them for the majority of its welding operations 
(including all front pipe welds, all circular welds on the muffler, and the major welds on 
the central pipe). 
 
An interesting feature of these operations is that the level of manning on sections of the line 
using robots is very high by the standards of the U.S., Europe or Japan, where a single 
operator will control several robots: Plant B, by contrast, uses one operative per robot. The 
payoff lies in the quite unusually low level of scrap losses: while Plant A achieves a loss 
rate of 2% of the total materials cost (equivalent to 1% of plant sales revenue, 
corresponding to the threshold level regarded as the norm among multinational exhaust 
makers), Plant B achieves the extremely low figure of 0.16%. To put this in perspective, it 
is worth noting that for each $100 Plant spends on materials and components (excluding 
catalytic converters), it spends only $2.50 on labour. A 2% scrap rate implies a loss of $2 
on each $100 spent on materials, and reducing the scrap rate to 0.16% implies a saving of 
$1.84.  To achieve an equal saving on the corresponding labour cost of $2.50 would require 
a quadrupling of labour productivity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 A manifold is the section of an exhaust which joins together the inflow from several pipes into a single flow.  
This can be made (cheaply) from cast iron, or else by welding sections of steel tube. 
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Quality Benchmarking 
Figure 3.5 shows external and internal defect rates, expressed in parts per 
million, for 21 of the 24 firms surveyed. (Three firms were unable to supply a 
figure for internal defect rates). The most striking feature to emerge relates to 
the figures for external defect rates.  This is the leading indicator of quality, as 
perceived by the purchaser (i.e. the car makers). As noted earlier, a threshold 
figure of 100 ppm is currently regarded by leading international car makers as 
a benchmark for world class producers.8 This threshold is exceeded for 14 of 
the 21 firms, seven from India and seven from China. 
 
Figure 3.5 Internal and External Defect Rates 
 
Note:  The scale is logarithmic.  Rates below 1 ppm are recorded as 1 ppm.  Three firms did not 
report external defect rates.  Two Indian seat makers had almost identical internal and external rates 
and the corresponding points are indistinguishable at (1,600) on the figure. 
 
                                                 
8 The Andersen study of 1996 identified a median level of 500 ppm for seats and 100 ppm for exhausts as the 
threshold for world class standards.  However, industry-wide norms have advanced rapidly over the past 7 
years, and a figure of 100 ppm is now regarded as the appropriate norm. 
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Seat makers in both countries achieve relatively good scores, with those in 
India being markedly lower (4 out of 6 having no unit supplied to customers 
rejected in the past year). Five out of 6 Chinese seat suppliers have scores 
below 100 ppm, though only one has a score comparable to the top four 
Indian firms (reporting a level of 10 ppm). 
 
Exhaust producers in both countries have much higher external defect rates: 
two Indian producers and one Chinese producer attain rates below 100 ppm, 
while two further producers, (both Chinese) achieve rates in the range of 100-
200 ppm.  The tail of low performance is longer in India: one firm reported an 
external defect rate of 1% (10,000 ppm) while two firms were unable to 
supply a figure (and ancillary information on these firms suggest a figure 
exceeding 1%). 
 
While external defect rates are directly relevant to buyers, the internal defect 
rate provides a key insight into the tightness of quality control during the 
production process. The internal rate is based upon a count of all units that are 
‘pulled from the line’ during the production process, or which fail to pass first 
inspection. (Such units are normally set aside for re-work, though in some 
cases they may be scrapped). Internal defect rates are typically much higher 
than external rates. As Figure 3.5 illustrates, there is a clear positive 
correlation between internal and external rates; both reflect the tightness of 
quality control in the production process and in final inspection. External 
defect rates for both countries lie mostly in the 1000-10,000 ppm range; one-
half of the Chinese firms and one-half of the Indian firms have rates of 2000 
ppm or less, corresponding to the threshold for world class performance in the 
Andersen study. 
 
36 
These results suggest that the median firm in both countries is operating at, or 
close to, international best practice levels. Two ancillary measures of 
international best practice confirm this view: 
 
a) The frequency of delivery to customers is widely used as one indicator 
of effective coordination between producer and customer. This is 
typically higher for seat producers, whose plants are usually located in 
the immediate vicinity of the customer. All six Chinese seat producers, 
and five of the six Indian producers, deliver at least once per day to 
their main customer. For exhaust producers, all six Chinese firms 
deliver at least once a day, though only three of the six Indian producers 
achieve this level. 
 
b) The level of inventory held is a good ancillary indicator of the tightness 
of control of the manufacturing operation. The usual measure is the 
‘stock turn ratio’, which is defined as the value of annual production 
divided by the value of materials and work in progress in the plant on a 
typical day. Thus a firm that holds one week’s production in the form of 
materials and work-in-progress and which operates 52 weeks in a year, 
has a stock turn ratio of 52. Among seat producers in this study, 
Chinese firms achieve higher turn ratios: four out of six report a turn 
ratio exceeding 100, corresponding to world class levels in the 
Andersen study; all 6 Indian firms have ratios in the range 22-52. For 
exhaust producers, the calculation of stock turn ratios is more difficult, 
as some raw materials are often held in relatively large quantities as 
they are sourced from distant steel plants, and there is a concern about 
stock-outs. Figures on stock turn ratios are less reliable in this case: 
only 3 of the Chinese firms, and 4 of the Indian firms reported figures. 
A figure of 35 was the world class threshold in the Andersen study; all 
but one of the seven reporting firms had a rate in the range 10-50, the 
exception being an Indian firm (with a ratio of 120). 
 
Productivity and Quality 
A natural question to raise in this setting is whether productivity is correlated 
with quality across different seat or exhaust plants. Here, there are two forces 
at work. One way of cutting external defect rates would be to devote more 
personnel to quality control  and checking, leading to higher quality and lower 
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productivity, and so to a negative relationship. On the other hand, the 
establishment of well-designed working practices might be expected to 
contribute to improvements both in productivity and in quality, leading to a 
positive relationship. The path-breaking study of Womack et al. on “lean 
production” techniques9 found productivity and quality to be uncorrelated 
across plants. By contrast, the Anderson study cited earlier found a clear 
positive correlation. 
 
The relationship for the plants in the present study is shown in Figures 3.6 (for 
seats) and 3.7 (for exhausts). In the case of seats, there is no significant 
relationship between productivity and quality. In the case of exhausts, a 
(weak) positive relationship is present. (Recalling the fact that productivity 
rises with production volume in exhausts (Figure 3.2), this suggests that high 
volume exhaust plants might exhibit both higher productivity and higher 
quality. However, a regression of quality on production volume, controlling 
for product complexity and capital intensity, and joint venture status, in the 
manner of Table 3.2 above, indicates that there is no significant link between 
production volume and quality). 
 
                                                 
9 Womack, J. P., D. T. Jones and D. Roos (1990) The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of Lean 
Production, New York : Rawson Associates.  Reprint, HarperPerennial, 1991. 
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Figure 3.6: Productivity versus Quality for Seat Producers 
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Note: Quality is measure by the external defect rate, shown on a logarithmic scale, as in Figure 3.5.  
The horizontal axis is inverted here, so that quality increases to the right. 
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Figure 3.7: Productivity versus Quality for Exhaust Producers 
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Note: Quality is measured as in Figure 3.6. 
 
Summing up 
The various measures of performance for seat and exhaust makers suggest that 
quality levels in both countries are at, or are close to, international best 
practice levels. The challenge for both sets of companies now lies in moving 
towards higher level capabilities.  Here, the aim is to offer a service to the car-
maker which involves a partnership in design activity. Such activities 
nowadays occur at the international, rather than the national level, as seat or 
exhaust makers begin from a ‘performance specification’ laid down by the car 
maker for a new platform; the seat or exhaust maker then develops a design 
that meets the required performance targets. One of the six Indian seat makers 
included in the present study is already operating at this level, using a team of 
40 
200 design engineers to provide new seat designs for the international 
market10. 
 
Conclusions 
The overall picture that emerges from this study is that the development of the 
auto industry supply chain in both China and India has proceeded very rapidly 
at the level of car makers and their first-tier suppliers: here current standards 
of supplier quality are at, or close to, world class standards. The main 
weakness of the supply chain lies in the fact that best practice techniques are 
permeating down to second tier suppliers in a very slow and uneven manner. 
The similarity in the pattern across both countries is striking. 
 
In the decade prior to WTO entry, both countries used domestic content 
restrictions to stimulate development of the component industry, with a view 
to widening and deepening the benefits accruing from attracting international 
car makers. Policies of this kind are not always appropriate, or successful; but 
in the present cases the ‘infant industry’ has been successfully nurtured, and 
international car-makers show no inclination to turn away from local suppliers 
following WTO entry.   
 
One of the key benefits from the development of enhanced capabilities in the 
component supply chain lies in the fact that it can lead to increases in exports 
of components and sub-assemblies from domestically based firms to overseas 
car-makers. While the development of the local supply chain in both countries 
has in large part been driven by the presence of multinational car makers, 
component exports are driven equally by multinational and domestic firms. 
Both India and China have a substantial body of purely domestic firms that 
                                                 
10 Similar developments are evident among Chinese component makers visited in the course of this study; one 
wheel maker, for example, is designing aluminium alloy wheels for several US car makers. 
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have achieved major successes in export markets; of the top ten component 
exporters in China, six are domestic firms; of India’s top 10, half are domestic 
firms (and three of these belong to a single domestic industrial group). 
 
A second key benefit from the development of enhanced capabilities among 
component suppliers, is that domestic car makers can out-source more 
effectively, achieving cost reductions while maintaining quality levels. This 
process is now beginning to take hold, particularly in India, where the 
Mahindra and Mahindra company has had a major success in following this 
route (Box 4). 
 
One of the most striking features of the leading component producers’ 
strategic decisions lies in their occasional use of highly capital intensive 
techniques in these low-wage environments. These choices are heavily driven 
by concerns with achieving high levels of quality control in the production 
process; for some Chinese exhaust-makers in particular, the use of robots for 
welding can lead to substantial gains through the achievement of levels of 
scrap wastage that are extremely low. 
 
Another strategic choice, and one which is more readily understandable in a 
low-wage environment, is the use of highly qualified individuals for shop-
floor operations. This is particularly striking in India, where some firms have 
achieved ‘award class’ levels of export success, by employing an all graduate 
work force. (Box 5). 
 
Underlying the rapid advance of first-tier producers towards world-class 
levels of quality has been a rapid absorption and diffusion of those working 
practices which originated in Japan in the 1960s and ’70-s and became 
standard in the U.S. and Europe during the 1990s. These include strong 
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emphasis on cooperation and team-work, the steady improvement of quality 
through diagnosis of sources of defects by groups of operatives, and the 
immediate implementation of strategies to pre-empt recurrences (‘quality 
circles’), the organisation of a tightly coordinated inflow of raw materials and 
parts and the outflow of finished  
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Box 4 
Piggy-backing the Supply Chain 
One of the most crucial indirect benefits of the recent wave of international joint ventures 
in the car industry, lies in the fact that these ventures stimulate the development of 
capabilities in the domestic supply chain – allowing domestic car makers to benefit from 
new possibilities in outsourcing from low-price, high quality suppliers. Perhaps the most 
striking instance of the mechanism in an Indian context is the case of Mahindra and 
Mahindra, one of India’s leading producers of commercial vehicles and tractors.  In 1994, 
the company went through a major restructuring, one outcome of which was a new policy 
shift in favour of substantial outsourcing of components and sub-assemblies. Over the 
following four years, virtually all components, other than engines, transmission systems 
and body (skin) panels began to be outsourced. For engines, the head and block were 
bought in from a local supplier in semi-finished form; all transmission components were 
bought in. For rear axles, the centre bracket was bought in as a casting and machined in-
house, but the tubes and shafts were bought in from local suppliers in fully finished form.  
This shift in reliance on the local supply chain came to a peak with the firm’s introduction 
of the Scorpio van, a light multi-use vehicle launched in 1998. The Scorpio van was 
designed in-house, using an Italian design house as a consultant on styling, and the 
outsourcing policy was pushed to new levels, with a network of 110 local suppliers.  This 
permitted unit production costs to be much lower than would have otherwise been possible, 
and allowed the Scorpio to be sold at an ex-dealer price (including air-conditioning and 
power steering) of 5.5 lakh rupees ($11,000), which was around 60% of the price 
anticipated by industry observers at the time of its launch. Sales of the Scorpio have 
transformed the financial fortunes of Mahindra and Mahindra during the five years since its 
launch. 
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Box 5 
Wage Rates and Employment Policies 
 
One of India’s largest component exporters, an independent domestic company, operates a 
policy of employing only graduates on all shop floor operations. As one executive 
explained, “Twenty per cent of our local taxi drivers have degrees. By insisting on graduate 
qualifications, we can empower all individuals and give them freedom to reach goals. We 
need people who can operate computer-controlled equipment without supervision.” 
 
The theme of India’s excess supply of highly-qualified individuals with poor employment 
prospects is an old one. Current trends in some parts of the car industry are driven by a 
search to take advantage of this.  One Indian seat maker employs only science graduates for 
all production line operations. While this employment strategy might seem to risk a high 
rate of labour turnover, this is not the case: the current quit rate of 4% per annum is seen by 
the firm as acceptable. While this strategy raises the firm’s wage costs, the payoff in terms 
of quality more than outweighs this.  The firm’s external defect rate is below the figure of 
50 ppm regarded as “award standard” by multinational seat makers; all line workers 
operate in “quality circle” teams, all speak English and most can do formal presentations to 
visitors, and interact directly with foreign executives visiting the plant. The plant is seen by 
the multinational joint venture partner as one of its leading plants worldwide, and its 
production engineers travel abroad to sister plants to transfer know-how. 
 
products, thus minimizing inventory costs, and so on. These practices are 
standard among all twelve of the seat plants visited in the course of the study, 
both joint ventures and domestic companies.   
 
This reflects, in part, the fact that car producers interact very closely with seat 
suppliers, so that independent domestic seat plants gain production know-how 
from their main customer. The prevalence of such practices is uniformly lower 
across all of the exhaust plants visited; in these plants, there is again a strong 
focus on results as measured by external defect rates, scrap losses, and labour 
productivity, but the means of achieving these results are less uniform across 
firms, and the organization of production varies widely. This is reflected in the 
higher levels of external defect rates among exhaust makers in both countries.   
 
These qualifications notwithstanding, the performance of seat and exhaust 
makers, as well as the performance of the general run of first tier suppliers to 
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new generation car makers, has reached levels that are at, or close to, 
international best practice. The main challenge now facing the industries lies 
in the extension of international best practice to second and third tier 
component suppliers.  
